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논 문

Balance of Power in the 11th~12th Century East Asian Interstate Relations

Peter Yun*

I. The Rhetoric of the Tribute System and the Reality of the Treaty System

Scholars have tended to view relations between China and its neighboring states during the premodern times mostly in terms of the China-centered tribute system model. China as the largest and the most culturally advanced state would claim universal rule, and its impressive size, culture, power, and wealth supposedly induced foreign rulers to seek recognition as tributaries in a hierarchical "Chinese world order." Based on a deep-rooted in Confucian ideology, the Chinese ruler, known as the Son of Heaven, was considered to be the only legitimate ruler of, not just China, but the entire known world or "All under Heaven[天下]." If and when Chinese dynasties did accept equal or even inferior status vis-à-vis other people, it was considered only as a temporary measure and anomalous phenomenon.

By the Han dynasty, the tribute system had become "a proper form in which Sino-foreign relations could be regulated in keeping with the general imperial order(Yü 1967, 39)." The Chinese dynasties "had begun to believe that the tributary relationship was the only normal one which did not conflict with their view of the known world(Wang 1968, 41)." Indeed, the conduct of regular interstate exchanges in premodern period has mostly been Chinese or Confucian in concept, ritual, and rhetoric. However, the Han Chinese dynasties'

* Youngsan University

ideology and sense of superiority never prevented them to deal realistically with the changing political reality. China often showed much flexibility in interstate relations as it adopted various strategies from war to appeasement. Chinese dynasties could and did retreat from its claim of superiority and sent its princesses and large amount of payments [subsidies or tributes 歲幣], and there has always been an underlying Chinese tradition of conducting relations with neighboring countries on a basis of equality if desirable or forced(Tao 1988, 8). While the ideological aspect is often the most noticeable in historical records, we must not ignore complexity of interactions and negotiations based on realism and pragmatism. The tribute system in history actually encompassed a wide range of political relationships that ranged from total subjugation to equality and even to the "barbarian" superiority.

Han Chinese dynasties may have convinced themselves that these non-Chinese states adhering to their conventions of the tribute system was a manifestation of evidence of China's superiority, but acceptance of the form of the tribute system did not signify that the foreign states were actually committed to the cultural and philosophical meaning behind the Chinese style diplomatic forms(i.e., the tribute system). Elaborate Chinese diplomatic protocols and rituals were fashionable and imposing, but the neighboring states utilized the system and accepted and practiced the Chinese-defined system of interstate relations only because it was practical and advantageous.

The 11^{th}-12^{th} century reality reflects the interstate relations governed by the treaty system based on the principle of reciprocity among several states(Franke and Twitchett 1994, 16-21; Yun 1998). This multi-centered interstate system allowed smaller states of Goryeo and the Xia to skillfully exploit continental conflicts and rivalry between the Manchurian Khitan and the Song Chinese states and to assert more independent foreign policies. We find two concurrent triangular interstate relations: Goryeo-Song-Khitan in the northeast and Xia-Song-Khitan in the northwest(Yun 2005, 49-53). Goryeo and the Tangut Xia were contemporary states that faced similar challenges in the interstate relations, and their foreign policies show remarkable resemblances. While smaller than the Khitan or the Song, their military capabilities were considerable and could disrupt military balance of power. Thus,

Goryeo and the Xia functioned as balancers in the military equilibrium by forcing the stronger Manchurian and Chinese dynasties to divide their military resources. Goryeo and the Xia, at times concurrently and other times alternately, did acknowledge Khitan and Song suzerainty, and they have been described invariably as "vassals" or "tributaries." However, Goryeo and Xia kings never swore homage and fealty to the Chinese court and did not owe any political, economic, or military obligations. In fact, they often asserted their own ethnocentric and "pluralist" worldview(Breuker 2010, 193-219) in the Northeast Asian multi-state system.

Song China(960-1279) unified the China proper in the late 10th century but its territorial expansion toward the north and the west encountered two strong nomadic neighbors. The Khitan empire occupied parts of North China and Manchuria, and the Tangut Xia controlled modern Northwest provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu in the Ordos region. Although Song Chinese officials could not fail to express their sense of cultural superiority, they were forced to accept the "diplomatic parity" in the Northeast Asian multi-state system(Rossabi 1983, 12). As for Goryeo and the Xia, the Song viewed its smaller neighbors in different ways. Whereas Goryeo was considered a "loyal" tributary state that admired Chinese culture and a potential military ally against the dangerous northern nomadic peoples, the Tangut Xia was a dangerous "barbarian" state that threatened border security, and a Chinese historian once commented that the Xia never really paid tribute to any empire(*Songshi*, 486.14030). Yet the fundamental difference was not the degree to which Goryeo or the Xia adhered to the tribute system or the Chinese institutions and culture, but the geopolitical configuration. Because the Xia shared common landed borders with the Khitan and Song, it would be involved with frequent and direct confrontations with its neighbors. On the other hand, Goryeo and the Song did not share a common border, and relations remained generally amicable.

The monumental event in the 11th century Northeast Asian interstate relations was the signing of the Treaty [or Covenant] of Shanyuan [澶淵之盟] on January 19, 1005. It was in the form of "oath-letters" that provided for "friendly relations" in exchange for the Song

annual payments of 100,000 taels(*liang* 兩) of silver and 200,000 bolts(*pi* 匹) of silk(*Songshi*, 7.126-27, *Liaoshi*, 14.160). The Song was not the first or the last Chinese dynasty that tried to buy peace by providing subsidy to their northern neighbors. The Han dynasty often opted to deal with foreign crises by sending annual imperial "gifts" and "princesses" in exchange for their pledge of peace in the border region(Yü 1967, 10), and the great Tang Empire also sent subsidies to the Uighurs for military assistance. The Tang had also concluded treaties with the Tibetan empire on the basis of equality(Li 1956, 1-99). Of course, the Song court made every effort to save its "face" by denying that these annual payments were "tributes," whereas the Khitan would proclaim to its people and other states that they were indeed "tributes" from the Chinese(Wittfogel 1949, 326).

The Treaty of Shanyuan became the model of interstate relations prior to the rise of the Mongols in the 13th century. The treaty officially recognized two Sons of Heaven, thereby ended the charade of China as the center of the world. At the same time, the treaty was able to provide conditions for long periods of peace, trade, and economic prosperity in Northeast Asia. The regular diplomatic exchanges set up by the treaty facilitated close communications and prevented a potential source of conflict from developing into a major military confrontation.

The complex historical reality of the 11th-12th century multi-centered interstate relations cannot be fully appreciated by the tribute system model that was largely an ideological reconstruction to re-impose the China-centered world order by the Ming dynasty after the 14th century(Wills 1984, 14, 173). Once we break through the shell of the ritualized language of the tribute system and put Northeast Asian interstate relations in their proper historical and geopolitical setting, pragmatic concerns in interstate relations become evident. The most basic objective in foreign policy formulation was always the state's ultimate concern with its self-preservation, and geopolitical configuration often defined the problem of security and determined potential enemies and allies.

The tribute system model did provide a description of the basic features of premodern East Asian interstate relations in theory and practice and showed how such a system became

so deeply embedded in traditional Chinese political ideology. However, it is incorrect to equate the nominal forms and terminologies of the hierarchical "tribute system" with the actual existence of the "Chinese World Order." A brief examination of the military clashes between Goryeo, the Khitan, the Song, and the Xia in the 11th-12th century would serve to illustrate the inadequacy of the idealistic and culturalistic framework of the tribute system.

Ⅱ. Goryeo-Khitan Wars in the Late 10th and Early 11th Centuries

It is true that the Goryeo dynasty's(918-1392) relations with the Khitan state were marked by military clashes and open hostility, whereas generally peaceful and friendly relations prevailed with Song China. Scholars often pointed to cultural and ideological factors to account for this difference. It was said that Goryeo's cultural features based on rice cultivation were similar to those of China but fundamentally different from nomadic or semi-nomadic Khitans and Jurchens. Goryeo also supposedly accepted the ideological validity of the Chinese concept of tribute system, admired Chinese culture. In the often quoted passage, Song Taizong's edict to Goryeo in the late tenth century would appeal to the idea of the "defense of their common culture" against the Khitan(Wang 1983, 53). While Goryeo may have admired and adopted many of China's culture and institutions, there is little evidence that it accepted the notion of Chinese political superiority as the natural order of things. On the contrary, the early Goryeo records suggest otherwise. Goryeo used the neutral designation of the "Western Dynasty[西朝]" not the "Superior State[上國]" to refer to Song China(*Goryeosa*, 93:16b2). Moreover, the monograph section of the *Goryeosa* made no distinction among the embassies from the Song and the Khitan [and the Jurchen Jin of the later period].

A close examination of political and military situation reveals a crucial geopolitical factor in Goryeo's hostility toward Manchurian states that posed security threat to Goryeo. Goryeo was aware of its place and role in Northeast Asian multistate system, and its main concern

was the preservation of the state and security of northern border through careful maintenance of the balance of power. The early rhetoric of the recovery of the former Goguryeo territory notwithstanding, Goryeo's foreign policy was by and large cautious and conservative one that sought to maintain the status quo.

As they were both pressured from the north by the Khitan military expansion in the 10th century, Goryeo and the Song regarded each other as a potential ally. The Song court often used promises of cultural and material rewards to entice Goryeo, while Goryeo appealed to the vanity of the Chinese imperial pretension. Yet the early relations show unrealistic expectation of military assistance and disappointments. While there were potential political and territorial benefits in the military alliance, the risk of open conflict against the Khitan empire was too great for policy makers of both Goryeo and the Song to take actual steps toward alliance. Thus, when the Song was hard pressed by the Khitans in 986, Goryeo refused to provide military assistance despite Song requests. On the other hand, all through the three major Khitan invasions in 993, 1010, and 1018, the Song never came to the aid of Goryeo.

While an active military alliance never materialized between Goryeo and the Song, the potential threat of Goryeo-Song alliance did prevent all out invasion on either state by the Khitans. The Khitan was stronger militarily than either the Song or Goryeo but it lacked the military capacity to wage and sustain warfare on two fronts. The Khitan was indisputably the greatest military power at the time, but it also had to contend with many hostile states and tribal groups that surrounded the empire. Thus, the *Liaoshi* stated,

> The territory of Liao in the east adjoined Korea. In the south it valiantly rivaled the six dynasties of Liang, Tang, Jin, Han, Zhou, and Song. In the north it was close to about ten important states, such as Tsu-pu and Chu-pu-ku. In the west it controlled about a hundred strong states, such as Hsi Hsia [Xi Xia], Tang-hsiang, T'u-hun, Uighur, and others... Surrounded on the four sides by militant peoples, [Liao] crouched in their midst like a tiger whom no one dared

to challenge(Wittfogel 1949, 554, *Liaoshi*, 46.742).

As it fought fierce battles against Song China in the late 10th century, the Khitan could deploy only a part of their total military capacity in battles because of a possibility of an attack from the rear. The Song and Goryeo were strong enough to stand their ground against the partial strength of the Manchurian state. They clearly perceived this military balance of power and tried to maximize the strategic potential and usefulness of each other vis-à-vis the Khitan at the time(*Xu zizhi tongjian changbian*, 150.3650). In the mid-1040's, the Song official Fu Bi 富弼 and others advocated a pro-Goryeo policy as part of his defense plan for the northern border, especially after they observed the military strength of the Goryeo in its victory over the Khitan in 1019. Fu and others believed that Goryeo could provide a rear guard against the Khitan and force the Khitan to split its military resources(*Xu zizhi tongjian changbian*, 150.3650-3. See also Rogers 1959, 18-22). Of course, the Khitan was well aware of this Song strategy, and it was very careful not to be drawn into a two-front war. Here the Khitan took on the smaller Goryeo to prevent a military alliance(Tao, 1988, 85), and this explains why the Goryeo-Song relations never seemed to have been a major point of contention between the Khitan and the Song, whereas they were of a particular concern between the Khitan and Goryeo. The primary objective of the Khitan aggression against Goryeo was not territorial expansion but prevention of military alliance between the Korean and Chinese states.

As it had to deal with the powerful and aggressive Khitan state in the 10th century, Goryeo came to recognize the Khitan as the suzerain state after the first major Khitan invasion in 993. This acknowledgment of the Khitan superiority required Goryeo to break its diplomatic ties with Song, and the calendar in use since 963 was discarded and the Khitan calendar was adopted in 994.2(*Goryeosa*, 3:27a6-7). However, Goryeo still wanted to bring the Song into the conflict for leverage against the Khitan. Only a few months later in 994.6, the court sent an envoy to the Song urging military action against the Khitan(*Goryeosa*, 3:27b4-5), but the Song, preoccupied with the Tanguts, refused this overture from Goryeo(*Xu*

zizhi tongjian changbian, 36.789-90, 74.1695). Disappointed by the Song refusal to provide help, Goryeo simply stopped sending tributes to the Song(*Songshi*, 487.14042).

Goryeo now tried to accommodate the Khitan by dispatching three tribute missions from 994 to 995 and sending ten boys to study the Khitan language(*Liaoshi*, 13.144-147; *Goryeosa*, 3: 27b5-6, 28b6-7). In 995 the Goryeo King Seongjong 成宗 even proposed a marriage alliance with the Khitan court, and he was said to have been granted marriage with a daughter of Xiao Hengde and Princess Yueguo, the third daughter of the Khitan emperor Jingzong(r. 969-82). Whereas the Korean source *Goryeosa* wrote that the Khitan court "approved marriage[許嫁]," the Khitan history *Liaoshi* recorded that the princess "married down[下嫁]." It appears that the marriage was probably arranged but never actually took place. As Xiao Hengde had married Princess Yueguo in 983, any offspring of that union would have been only twelve years old in 995 at the most(*Liaoshi*, 88.1342), and we have no record of any Khitan princess among King Seongjong's consorts(*Goryeosa*, 3:28b7-8; *Liaoshi*, 13.147, 65.1002, 88.1342-43). However, when the Khitan Princess Yueguo died in the following year(996), the Goryeo court would dispatch a special condolence embassy, and Goryeo really had no reason or obligation to dispatch such an envoy unless the princess was indeed King Seongjong's mother-in-law [to be](*Goryeosa*, 3:29b7-8; *Liaoshi*, 13.150, 115.1520). In any case, the marriage proposal itself shows that the Goryeo court was willing to pursue a policy of accommodation toward the Khitans. The following year, King Seongjong died, an embassy was duly dispatched to notify the Khitan court(*Liaoshi*, 13.150). However, the Song court was never formally informed of the news by an official Goryeo embassy(*Songshi*, 487.14042).

Once its border with Goryeo was secured, the Khitan concentrated its military efforts against the Song in the following years. Goryeo was generally left alone, and when King Mokchong(997-1009) came to the throne in 997, the Khitan court quickly confirmed the succession. Goryeo tried to adjust its policy in the fast changing and tense interstate situations by continuing to dispatch regular envoys to the Khitan court. It sent congratulatory messages after the Khitan military victory over the Song in 1002(*Liaoshi*, 14.157) and

after the Treaty of Shanyuan in 1004(*Liaoshi*, 14.161).

However, after the Treaty of Shanyuan stabilized its relations with the Song, the Khitan would turn its attention to Goryeo. The Khitan may have regretted their decision to let Goryeo to take control of the area southeast of the Amnok(Yalu) River 鴨綠江. In 1009, the Khitan court was given a convenient pretext to launch an attack on Goryeo when Kang Cho, a military commander of the Western Capital, killed King Mokchong 穆宗 (997-1009) and installed King Hyeonjong 顯宗(1009-31)(*Goryeosa*, 3:37b5-38a7, 4:1b9-2a3). Ostensibly to punish Kang Cho's crime of regicide, the Khitan Emperor Shengzong 聖宗 (983-1030) personally led an army of 400,000, quickly seized several border prefectures north of Pyeongyang 平壤 and entered the capital city of Gaegyeong on the first day of lunar year 1011 (*Liaoshi*, 15.168; *Goryeosa*, 4:5a2-3, 6b5-6). However, even with this apparent military victory, its supply lines had been exposed to the attacks by the regrouping Goryeo military. Thus, the Khitans began a hasty retreat only ten days later after having looted and burned much of the capital. They left the Goryeo capital on the eleventh day and crossed the Amnok River on the twenty-eighth day, as it suffered a great loss of men and materials to Goryeo counterattacks(*Goryeosa*, 4:7a1-5; *Liaoshi*, 15.169). The Khitan had turned back before obtaining any concession from Goryeo.

The Goryeo court now dispatched envoys to "thank" the Khitan court for the withdrawal in 1011.4(*Goryeosa*, 4:8b6-7), and three more embassies were sent in the eighth, tenth, and eleventh month(*Goryeosa*, 4:10a8, 10b9-11a1, 11a2-3). In the fourth month of the following year(1012), the Khitan court finally notified Goryeo of the conditions for settlement that included an unprecedented demand of personal attendance of Goryeo king at the Khitan court(*Liaoshi*, 15.170; *Goryeosa*, 4:12a4). When Hyeonjong refused to comply on the pretext of illness, the Khitan renewed its attacks on the Six Fortresses in the Amnok region that Goryeo had fortified after the first Khitan invasion(*Liaoshi*, 15.171; *Goryeosa*, 4:13a1-3). While Goryeo was able to hold its ground, it also suffered serious defeats with loss of several tens of thousands of troops in 1016.1(*Liaoshi*, 15.176-177, 179; *Goryeosa*, 4:19b3-4).

While the battles raged, the two sides continued to exchange envoys(4 Goryeo embassies to Khitan and 9 Khitan embassies to Goryeo from 1012.10 to 1016.1) to find compromise. Goryeo was unnerved by the Khitan fortification of border prefectures and building of a permanent pontoon bridge across the Amnok in 1014. This was a direct threat to Goryeo's border security(*Liaoshi*, 15.175). This led to a hardening of policy. Goryeo detained Khitan envoys in 1015 and refused to admit other envoys in 1016(*Goryeosa*, 4: 18a7-8, 19b5). Once again, Goryeo sought to enlist military help from the Song, sending embassies in 1014.11, 1015.11, 1017.7, and 1019.8(*Goryeosa*, 4: 16b7-9, 19a9-b2, 23b9-24a1, 30b8-9), and even appealed to the sense of Chinese superiority by voluntarily adopting again the Song regnal titles of "Dazhong xiangfu 大中祥府" in 1016(*Goryeosa*, 4:23a3-4) and "Tianxi 天禧" in 1018.10(*Goryeosa*, 4:28b2). However, the Song court has been enjoying peace after the Treaty of Shanyuan, and it refused to take unnecessary military risks by aiding Goryeo.

With Goryeo's rejection of the Khitan demands, there came another major clash. In 1018 the Khitan launched its third major expedition, but its army of 100,000 was unable to take the well-defended Goryeo fortresses in the north. Following the same strategy of the 1011 invasion, the Khitan army headed directly south to take the capital city, but this time it faced a stiff resistance from the strong Goryeo defense around capital(*Goryeosa*, 4:28b8-29a3; *Liaoshi*, 16.185). Having failed to take the capital, the Khitan troops began hasty retreat, but before it had reached the border, they were trapped and annihilated on the first day of the second month of 1019, and all but a few thousand of the original 100,000 that had crossed the Amnok perished(*Goryeosa*, 4:29b1-3). If the results of previous wars were not clear, this time Goryeo had scored a clear and decisive victory as evident in its enhanced international standing that brought formal submission of Jurchen tribes(Chu 2002, 34-5). However, the disaster of 1018 did not dissuade Khitans from assembling another expeditionary force in the late summer of 1019 (*Liaoshi*, 16.186). Goryeo once sent an embassy to the Song in 1019.8 but could not entice the Song into the conflict(*Goryeosa*, 4:30b8-9).

There were also other complication between Goryeo and Khitan by a major rebellion in Liaodong in 1029.8 by Dae Yeollim 大延琳, allegedly a seventh generation descendant of the founder of Balhae 渤海. Dae had declared the establishment of the new dynasty of "Xingliao 興遼" and organized his administration after the patterns of the former Balhae kingdom(*Liaoshi*, 17.203-4; *Goryeosa*, 5:13a3; *Goryeosa jeoryo*, 3:55a9-b1). Dae immediately sent an envoy to Goryeo to request assistance against the Khitan, but Goryeo not only rejected this overture but also made preparations for possible clash at the border(*Goryeosa*, 5:13a1-4, 14a5-6). Although Dae would make at least four more appeals to Goryeo for military assistance from 1029.9 and 1030.9, the Goryeo court maintained its conservative and pragmatic policy of non-involvement, even as a few officials made a suggestion that Goryeo should take advantage of the chaos to seize the territories along the Amnok River(*Goryeosa*, 94:13a8-9).

While battles continued, the Goryeo court was also playing the "politics of regnal titles [年號]" with the Khitan court(Yun 2007). An official adoption of the imperial regnal titles was one of the symbolic acts required for a tributary state, and a diplomatic break was often signified by abolition of the regnal title of the "suzerain" state. When the new Khitan emperor Xingzong 興宗(1031-55) came to the throne, Goryeo refused to adopt his regnal titles *Jingfu* 景福(1031-32) and Chongxi 重熙(1032-55). Instead, the Goryeo court continued to use the regnal title *Taiping* 太平 of the deceased emperor Shengzong(982-1031). Here Goryeo was using the regnal title of the deceased Khitan emperor Shengzong symbolically to pressure the Khitan court to honor its previous recognition of the political legitimacy and security of Goryeo as manifested in Shengzong's investiture of Goryeo king. In the game of political legitimacy, just as the "suzerain" state could deny the investiture, a "tributary" state could also refuse the adoption of the regnal titles.

As the conflict dragged on, neither Goryeo nor the Khitan could expect a decisive victory and the cost of war put a severe strain on the state finances. Finally, a compromise was reached in which Goryeo acknowledged nominal suzerainty of the Khitan in exchange for the peace on its northern border. Peace would prevail after 1039, but relations between

Goryeo and Khitan were never warm. Goryeo began a construction of defensive "The Thousand *Ri* Wall" made of stone and measuring twenty-five *cheok* 尺(a little over 7.5 meters) in height that eventually stretched from the mouth of the Amnok to the East Sea (aka Sea of Japan) from 1033 to 1044(*Goryeosa jeoryo*, 4:5a2-7). By the 11th century, Goryeo's foreign policy objective had shifted from the expansion into the former territory of Goguryeo to preservation of its northern border.

Ⅲ. Xia-Song War in the mid-11th century

The Tangut state of Great Xia(usually known as Western Xia [西夏]) was another important player in East Asian balance of power. Because the official dynastic history of the Xia has never been compiled, its history and culture have been largely forgotten, neglected, and misinterpreted. However, with its capital near the site of modern Yinchuan, the Xia ruled over large, strategic, fertile and productive territory of the Gansu Corridor from Inner Mongolia in the north to Sichuan in the south. Unlike Goryeo, the Xia was engaged in frequent border conflicts with the Song. It was the Song that initiated the conflict as it tried to gain control of the trade route in the strategic Ordos region that also produced horses, cattle and fine table salt(Dunnell 1994, 168-72). Initially, it looked as if the bigger, stronger, and wealthier Song would simply overwhelm the smaller Xia state, but the Chinese often suffered setbacks against the superior cavalry force of the Xia. Many Song officials also believed that the Khitans and Tanguts were always colluding together to exact more concessions from the Song(Tao 1988, 57-8, 63), and this fear of the two-front war prevented the Song from concentrating all its military resources. The Song was never able to defeat the smaller Tangut state.

The Xia also outmaneuvered the Song on the diplomatic front(Dunnell 1996, 13). In 986 the Tangut ruler Li Jiqian offered to recognize the Khitan suzerainty, and he was given a Khitan imperial princess as his bride in 989 and then formally invested as the King of Xia [夏國王] in the following year(*Liaoshi*, 11.119, 12.134, 13.140). Because of this

Khitan connection, even when the Xia ruler was killed in 1004 during the fighting against the Tibetans, the Song was not able to take advantage of the opportunity due to the Khitan invasion.

In the early 11th century, military stalemates between the Xia and the Song eventually resulted in an agreement fundamentally identical to the Treaty of Shanyuan. The major difference was that while the Treaty of Shanyuan with the Khitan was based on "equality," the one with the Xia had been based on nominal Song "superiority." However, the basic framework of the Song payments in exchange for peace of border region was the same. In return for acceptance of the nominal Song suzerainty, the Xia, just like the Khitan, gained an annual subsidy of 10,000 *taels* of silver, 10,000 bolts of silk, 30,000 strings of money, 20,000 catties of tea, and the lifting of the ban on Tangut salt in China(*Songshi*, 485.13989-90).

In 1038, an ambitious Xia ruler Li Yuanhao 李元昊 would demand nominal equality as well. He changed the royal surname to Weiming [嵬名], proclaimed himself as the emperor of the "Great Xia[大夏]," and demanded official recognition from the Song. However, the Chinese continued to use Zhao, the Song royal surname it had bestowed on Li Jiqian in 991, whereas the Khitan court continued to use the other surname Li that had been bestowed to the Tangut royalty by the Tang court(Dunnell 1994, 181, 187). A Song official Fan Zhongyan argued that while an equal status had been given to the Khitans, the same should not be accorded to the Tanguts, and the Song refused to recognize another "emperor" on its border(Zhao Ruyu, *Song mingchen zouyi*, 133:28a-b). To pressure the Xia to back down, the Song cut off its relations and subsidies and closed border market. When the Xia retaliated by raiding Song border districts, this set off fierce military confrontations that would last for six years(*Songshi*, 186.4563).

In the late 1039, the Xia attacked several border areas but retreated without much success. On the other hand, the Song faced great problems in defending its northwestern border region where population was sparse and military posts were located far between. In short, the Song had to solve a very difficult logistical problem of transporting soldiers

and supplies. The Song also needed cavalry to be effective in battles, but it would require considerable time and investment. Moreover, a severe famine in North China in the same year put a heavy burden to the state finances(*Songshi*, 312.10222). The war with the Xia went badly for the Song. The battle at the Haoshuichuan 好水川 in early 1041 was the greatest defeat since the establishment of the Song dynasty, and the shocked court was said to have concealed this terrible news from the emperor for ten days(*Songshi*, 10.211). After this disaster, the Song lost any initiative in the war and no longer attempted to attack the Xia territory.

The Song was particularly fearful about possible military alliance between the Xia and Khitan. The Song regularly sent envoys to inform the Khitan court of its actions against the Xia to forestall any Khitan intervention. The Khitan-Song relations had been peaceful since the Treaty of Shanyuan, and the Khitan had in fact turned down the Xia proposal for joint attacks on the Song. However, as the battles raged between the Xia and Song, the Khitan tried to extort substantial additional concessions from the vulnerable Song(*Liaoshi*, 19.229). In 1041 the Khitan emperor Xingzong deployed troops near the Song border(*Xu zizhi tongjian changbian*, 134.3208), and the Song court was gravely concerned about a possibility of two-front war.

In the spring of 1042, the Khitan envoy came to the Song capital and demanded return of the strategic Guannan [關南] region. It was originally a part of the 16 prefectures ceded to the Khitan by the Later Tang in 938 but that had later been re-conquered by the Later Zhou in 959(*Liaoshi*, 4.44-45). The Khitan envoy also demanded explanation for the Song attack on the Xia and the Song reinforcement and repair of defensive installations in Hebei in violation of the treaty. The Song refused any territorial concession but would be willing to consider an increase in subsidy and marriage of a Song princess to the Khitan emperor. In the summer, the Song initiated negotiations of increased annual subsidy to buy off the Khitan, but at the same time also displayed its determination to defend the border by holding military exercises and designating the Daming 大名 prefecture as the Northern Capital 北京(*Xu zizhi tongjian changbian*, 136.3260-5, 3267-8; *Songshi*, 11.214, 85.2105).

After a brief negotiation in 1042, the Khitan obtained from the Song an increase of 100,000 taels of silver [100% increase] and 100,000 bolts of silk [50% increase] over and above the amount of yearly payment agreed upon the Treaty of Shanyuan simply for its promise of non-involvement(*Liaoshi*, 19.227).

This increase in subsidy did not appear to have caused much problems for the Song court financially. Although some have suggested that the economy of the Song was "sorely strained by the huge tributes" and by the smuggling of cheap Khitan salt(Wittfogel 1949, 151, 174), the annual payment to the North constituted only one or two percent of the wartime military spending and less than one half percent of the total expenditure of the Song state. The amount of silk sent annually to the Khitan probably amounted only to the output of a single Song prefecture, and sixty percent or more of the silk eventually returned to the Song that enjoyed a substantial trade surplus with the Khitan. (*Xu zizhi tongjian changbian*, 70.1578; Wong 1974, 158). What really troubled the Song was not the monetary loss but the fact that the Khitan declared Song's yearly subsidies as "tributes [貢](*Liaoshi*, 19.227, 86.1323; Wittfogel 1949, 326)." Indeed, one modern scholar also described these Song subsidies as the "tribute in reverse(Yang 1968, 21)."

The Song was able to avert the Khitan military intervention, but battles continued against the Xia. In the fall of 1042, the Song again suffered a defeat in which thirteen generals and 9,400 troops were lost(*Songshi*, 289.9701-2). While the Xia was winning the battles, the Tanguts also had lost half of its troops since the war began in 1040. The Xia did not have enough manpower and resources to occupy and hold the Song territory, and it could only loot the place and retreat. Thus, it was turning into a war of attrition between superior cavalry force of the Xia and the larger population and economic power of the Song.

The two states finally began negotiation in early 1043, and the Song promised an annual subsidy of 100,000 bolts of silk and 30,000 *jin* 斤 of tea in return for the acknowledgment of the Song suzerainty. The Xia ruler was not satisfied with the Song offer and demanded larger amount of subsidy, trading rights of the envoys, and rights to sell salts at the border

markets. Only when the Song court relented to allow sale of the salt did the Xia ruler agreed to call himself as the "subject" of the Song. The war finally ended in the fifth month of 1044(*Xu zizhi tongjian changbian*, 149.3636-37), with the signing of the "sworn vassal-letter[誓表]" and "sworn decree[誓詔]." These terms themselves were self-contradictory as the "sworn letters" signified the parity of the two parties, while the terms "vassal" and "decree" indicated a hierarchical relationship(Rogers 1978, 8). Here we can see clear examples of the distinctively non-Chinese elements that had been introduced to the supposedly Han Chinese form of the tribute system. The Song court also officially invested Yuanhao as the "Ruler[主]," a compromise between the titles of "emperor[皇帝]" and "king [王]," of the Xia State and granted a large annual payment in 255,000 units(153,000 bolts of silk, 30,000 *jin* of tea, and 72,000 *liang* of silver)(*Xu zizhi tongjian changbian*, 152.3705-6; *Songshi*, 11.219).

For the Song, the human and material cost of the six-year war against the Xia was considerable, but even the greater blow was to its Sinocentric idealism of the tribute system in interstate relations. After the Treaty of Shanyuan, the Song court would try to repair its damaged imperial image with fabrication of "Heavenly Texts[天書]" in 1008(Cahill 1981). The dynasty also sought to legitimize itself through the *feng-shan* 封禪 sacrifice on Mount Tai [泰山] in the same year to offset the humiliation of the treaty and to claim political and cultural superiority over the Khitan(Tao 1988, 37). However, the memory of the military defeat and political compromise with the "smaller and inferior" Xia would trouble the Song for many years.

As the Xia and Song finally reached compromise, other trouble flared up in the Xia-Khitan relations. The Tanguts deeply resented the fact that the Khitan took most of the spoils of war and was mediating on the behalf of the Song Chinese. The Xia and Khitan also clashed over tribal groups that occupied the border region between them. The Khitans may also have found the Xia to be presumptuous to demand the equal standing as them. The subsequent military clashes between the Xia and the Khitan show that the "tributary relations" between the Khitan and the Xia never actually represented a dominant-sub-

ordinate relationship. In 1049, the Khitan emperor Xingzong personally led expeditionary forces that suffered a defeat the ninth month but managed a victory in the third month of 1050(*Liaoshi*, 20.240-41). Yet both sides soon realized that the continued fight against each other was futile and normalized relations were soon restored. The basic objectives for the two states were to ensure the border security and to obtain the Song annual subsidies.

Ⅳ. Conclusion: Balance of Power in East Asian Interstate Relations

The balance of power in Northeast Asia was briefly shaken in early twelfth century by the rapid rise of the Jurchen power. The Jurchen uprisings that began in 1114 exposed the military weakness of Khitan, and the Song court allied with the Jurchen in hopes of recovering the "lost" sixteen prefectures. Whereas the Xia continued to support the Khitan against the Song, Goryeo remained neutral during the chaotic time of the dynastic change from the Khitan to the Jurchen Jin. On the battlefield, Jurchens captured most of the Khitan territory, but the Song lost several crucial battles, and thereby its negotiating position became much weaker. Thus, the Song court desperately tried to entice Goryeo to acknowledge the Song "suzerainty" to enhance its standing.

It was the Song court that offered to formally invest King Sukchong even without any request from Goryeo. The Song must have been very surprised and disappointed when its offer of investiture was flatly refused by the Goryeo court(*Goryeosa*, 13:16a2-4). They must have assumed that Goryeo would jump at the opportunity to discard the Khitan titles and receive the "real" official recognition from the Song. In reality, however, the Song investitures carried as much or, to be more exact, as little legitimacy as those from the Khitan. These outside recognitions were merely token gestures that functioned to maintain official relations but had little influence on the political legitimacy of the Goryeo throne. In 1123 King Injong again refused the renewed Song offer of formal investiture, even though the Khitan had been all but destroyed and Goryeo had already discarded the Khitan calendar(*Goryeosa*, 15:5b2-6a7). Goryeo perceived correctly that the Song investiture would be

followed by requests for Goryeo's military assistance in its impending struggle against the Jurchens. Goryeo maintained neutrality in the Song-Jurchen war.

The foreign policies of Goryeo and the Xia were driven by pragmatic political considerations and not by a belief in a China-centered tribute system. Goryeo was careful not to invite unnecessary confrontation because of diplomatic contacts with the Song. The Song China did not represent the political(or even cultural) center and constituted only one component in Northeast Asian triangular geopolitical configuration. Goryeo preferred to maintained relations with the Song outside the boundaries of the tribute system for more than four decades in the mid-11th century. Goryeo and the Xia's geopolitical position and potential role made them active and important players in the establishment of new order in Northeast Asia. The study of pre-modern East Asian interstate relations is more than an inquiry into the Chinese viewpoints as reflected in Chinese historical records. The wars between main players in the multistate system expose the limitations of the overly ideological and culturalistic framework of the tribute system model for the study of the interstate relations of the time.

Song historians continued to lay a claim that their dynasty was the center of the world, but relations among the states in Northeast Asia from the 11th-12th century show that the other states paid little attention to the Song pretension. In the end, Song officials themselves could no longer depict the world within the terms of the ideal tribute system. The *Jiu Wudaishi* 舊五代史, compiled from 973 to 974 during the Northern Song, would employ the neutral term "waiguo 外國" for the foreign peoples instead of the traditionally derogatory term of the "barbarians[夷狄](*Jiu Wudaishi*, 137.1827-46)." The Song had recognized the reality of a "multi-centered interstate system," in which China was indeed merely one among equals.

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Abstract

Balance of Power in the 11th~12th Century East Asian Interstate Relations

Peter Yun

Scholars have tended to view relations between China and its neighboring states during the premodern period in terms of the China-centered tribute system model. However, one must not ignore complex interactions and negotiations based on realism and pragmatism in Northeast Asian interstate relations. In the 11th-12th century Goryeo and the Xia's geopolitical position and role made them active and important players in the establishment of new order in Northeast Asia. The multi-centered interstate system allowed them to skillfully exploit continental conflicts and rivalry between the Manchurian Khitan and the Song Chinese states and to assert more independent foreign policies. Although Goryeo and the Xia, at times concurrently and other times alternately, acknowledged Khitan and Song suzerainty, the Khitan and Song did not gain any real political, economic, or military advantages from their "suzerain" status.

The complex historical reality of the multi-centered interstate relations cannot be fully appreciated by the tribute system model. Once we break through the shell of the ritualized language of the tribute system and put Northeast Asian interstate relations in their proper historical and geopolitical setting, pragmatic and strategic concerns in interstate relations become evident. A brief examination of the military clashes between Goryeo, the Khitan, the Song, and the Xia in the 11th-12th century show inadequacy of the idealistic and culturalistic framework of the tribute system.

❑ Key words : Tribute system, Balance of power, Goryeo-Khitan War, Song-Xia War, Treaty of Shanyuan

국문초록

11-12세기 동아시아 국제관계에서의 세력균형

윤 영 인

전근대 동아시아 국제관계사 연구는 종종 '조공체제'의 틀을 통해 진행되곤 하였다. 조공체제 이론은 전근대 동아시아 국제관계의 기본 용어를 이해하고 나아가 어떻게 그러한 체제가 중원 역대 왕조의 정치사상에 깊게 뿌리박을 수 있었는가에 대한 설명을 제시한다. 그러나 14세기 이후 명에 의해 설정된 조공체제의 틀로 11-12세기 다원적 국제관계의 역사적 현실에 대한 포괄적인 이해는 불가능하다.

고려와 하는 새로운 동아시아 국제질서의 형성과 유지에 중요한 역할을 담당하였다. 이 두 국가는 만주와 중원 왕조의 충돌과 경쟁 사이에서 왕조의 안정과 정치·경제적 이익을 추구하는 독자적인 정책을 실행한다. 고려와 하는 때로는 동시에 때로는 번갈아 가며 거란과 송에 '조공'을 하기도 하였지만 이는 명목적인 것에 불과한 것으로 당시 국제관계의 현실과는 달랐다. 그러므로 11-12세기 고려, 거란, 송, 하 사이의 전쟁에 대한 고찰은 조공체제 이론의 한계를 보여준다.

❑ 주제어: 조공체제, 세력균형, 고려-거란전쟁, 송-[서]하전쟁, 전연의 맹약

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