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논 문

Marxism and the Question of Korean Unification*

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To abandon the past to the night of facticity is a way of depopulating the world. I would distrust a humanism which was too indifferent to the efforts of the men of former times; if the disclosure of being achieved by our ancestors does not at all move us, why be so interested in that which is taking place today; why wish so ardently for future realizations? To assert the reign of the human is to acknowledge man in the past as well [as] in the future.

— Simone de Beauvoir

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* This essay was written in the spring of 1989. However, what I discuss in it is still highly relevant to the context of Marxist or Communist regimes in Asia, particularly in China and North Korea, and to the issue of Korean unification. In the age of globalization, China or North Korea hardly matches its ideological founder Marx's vision of "world citizenship," which, I might add, surpasses his mentor Hegel whose ultimate end of history is the creation of the State as the march of God in history. The practical politics of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il is nothing but an idiosyncratic and personalized (Stalinesque) totalism. And Kim Jong Il's behavior is more extreme and erratic than his father's: it may be likened to a cranky, irascible, spoiled brat. My question is: what does South Korea gain from unification with North Korea? Does unification tame the nuclear power of North Korea to prevent a holocaust in Asia? Is it the humanitarian purpose of saving millions of starving North Korean citizens? Finally, is it the fulfillment of the old nostalgia of One Korea? The reactionary political totalism of Kim Jong Il is nothing but a perpetuation of the image of Korea as a "hermit kingdom" in the age of globalization.

In his retrospective intellectual autobiography, *Witness to an Extreme Century* (New York: Free Press, 2011), Robert Jay Lifton gives a brief three-page recount (80-82) of Mao's "revolutionary immortality." Lifton remarks that "whether studying events involving Chinese, Japanese, German, or

I. The Nature of Marxism as Movement

Marxism is, one of its observant commentators noted nine years ago, "an unsettling presence."[1] It is far more so today than any other period in the history of Marxism both as an intellectual and a political movement. Despite the recent reversal in China of political "democratization" and economic "entrepreneurship," Mikhail Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika appear to have brought "havoc" to the Marxist world. Coupled with them are the "liberalizing" events in the Eastern European Communist countries, especially in Poland in addition to the long-established tradition of Eurocommunism and polycentrism, the time seems to have come to talk about the "end of Marxism" as a political movement. Even with the end of Marxism as a political movement, however, history will be generous enough to remember and be affected by the "humanistic" legacy of Marx as one of the paradigmatic figures in the history of world's political thought. Be that as it may, Robert L. Heilbroner

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American culture, my inclination has been to connect experiences with the broader human psychological (or psychobiological) potential—with 'human nature'—rather than to isolate them as culturally unique. I came to understand all collective human behavior as containing three interwoven components: *the universal potential* just mentioned; the cultural shaping, over many centuries, of that potential; and recent historical forces, which often challenged those cultural forms" (*ibid*., 109. Emphases added). Now Lifton's emphasis is shifted from the cultural variations of "psychohistory" to the discovery of the "universal potential" or "human nature," that is to say, "psychohistory" lives in the shadow of the potential of the "psychobiological" universal. The idea of "symbolic immortality" as such may be transcultural. In his earlier work, however, Lifton was interested in exploring the cultural variants of symbolic immortality, e.g., it is ancestor-worship in China and a projection of the permanence of nature in Japan. The idea of the "universal" potential or otherwise is too abstract, unless it is explored in the context of particular cultural manifestations or formations. As Ralph Waldo Emerson puts it wisely, the universal/abstract is unappealing to us unless it is housed in the particular/concrete. Mao's "metaphoricality" of the peasantry that replaces Marx's original thesis of t he proletariat is a concrete historical and cultural phenomenon in order to bring about a Marxist revolution in China. In Sinic mentality, what counts is what is concrete or "historicist" (Mao's term) rather than what is universal or abstract. For more detailed discussions on these issues, see the author's forthcoming work: *Transversality and Intercultural Hermeneutics* (New York: Global Scholarly Publications).

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1) Robert L. Heilbroner, *Marxism: For and Against* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), 15.

summarizes the difficulty of defining Marxism as a unified movement:

> From the beginning, the work of Marx's followers has been characterized by bitter divisions and conflicting interpretations of Marx's work. But in recent years the divisions have become so pronounced and the interpretations so diverse that it is genuinely difficult to find the elements that unify the whole. Today there are Marxists who defend Marx's work as it stands and Marxists who would change nearly all of it; Marxists who feel that capitalism works essentially as Marx said it did, and Marxists who feel that the analysis of *Capital* no longer applies; Marxists who wish to reach out to religion and psychoanalysis and Marxists who feel that these are mere bourgeois diversions; Marxists who proudly call themselves orthodox and others who feel that Marxism has degenerated into ideology and is itself the chief obstacle to the attainment of a humane socialism. Indeed, the confusion of voices is so great that Eugene Kamenka, a lifelong scholar of Marxism, has declared that "the only serious way to analyze Marxist or socialist thinking may well be to give up the notion that there is a coherent doctrine called Marxism… [2]

So it may not be an exaggeration to conclude that there are as many Marxisms as there are major Marxists.

In the following pages, I will first describe Marx's thought as "social ontology" which is at once philosophical, political, and economic (Section II). Second, I will explore Maoism as Sinicized Marxism in action—a revolution within the revolution—in a developing nation (Section III) and the psychohistorical dimensions of Mao (Section IV) as both are relevant to the discussion of the allegedly Marxist ideology of Kim Il Sung (and his son Kim Jong Il) including his "immortal" desire for unification. Third, I will draw a brief conclusion

2) Ibid., 19.

concerning Kim's ideology and its impact on the "dialogue" between South and North Korea on the issue of unification (Section V).

Ⅱ. Marxism as Social Ontology

Marxism, as it has already been stressed, is many things. However, they all can be brought together under one common theme or rubric of social ontology which is at once (1) philosophical, (2) political, and (3) economic. By so doing, this paper stresses the continuity of Marx's own intellectual biography and defies the facile bifurcation or periodization of it in terms of the "early" and the "late."

First of all, as a philosophy of praxis in opposition to Hegelianism as a philosophy of theoria, Marxism is a philosophy *of* and *for* man par excellence whose "humanity," that is, the quality of being genuinely human, lies in his/her association with other human beings whose totality may be said to be the whole of "social ensembles." Writing in London in 1873 the second preface to *Das Kapital*, Marx stated without equivocation:

> My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, *i.e.*, the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. . . . I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevent him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must

> be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.[3]

The opposite of this humanism is alienation which is fourfold: man's alienation from (1) nature, (2) society or other people, (3) his/her own labor, and (4) ultimately himself/herself.[4] For Marx bourgeois civilization personifies or embodies alienation or the dehumanization of man par excellence.

Second, *revolution* which is an integral part of social ontology is the *political* instrument of transformation from the dehumanization of bourgeois society into the humanization of Communism. This transformation is by necessity a violent political transformation. Associated with this violent transformation are the darkest shadows of historical Marxism. In *Darkness at Noon*, Arthur Koestler, for instance, fictionalized Stalin's ruthless consolidation of power and his intolerance of opposition revealed in the Moscow trials in the 1930s. As the fictionalized N. S. Rubashov decries in his diary:

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3) Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 19-20.

4) Erich Fromm writes that "Marx's philosophy, like much of existentialist thinking, represents a protest against man's alienation, his loss of himself and his transformation into a thing; it is a movement against the dehumanization and automatization of man inherent in the development of Western industrialism. It is ruthlessly critical of all 'answers' to the problem of human existence which try to present solutions by negating or camouflaging the dichotomies inherent in man's existence. Marx's philosophy is rooted in the humanist Western philosophical tradition, which reaches from Spinoza through the French and German enlightenment philosophers of the eighteenth century to Goethe and Hegel, and the very essence of which is concern for man and the realization of his potentialities. For Marx's philosophy, which has found its most articulate expression in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* [*sic*], the central issue is that of the existence of the real individual man, who *is* what he *does*, and whose 'nature' unfolds and reveals itself in history. But in contrast to Kierkegaard and others, Marx sees man in his full concreteness as a member of a given society and of a given class, aided in his development by society, and at the same time its captive. The full realization of man's humanity and his emancipation from the social forces that imprison him is bound up, for Marx, with the recognition of these forces, and with social change based on this recognition." *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York: Frederick Unger, 1961), 5-6.

> the ultimate truth is penultimately always a falsehood. He who will be proved right in the end appears to be wrong and harmful before it. . . . We were the first to replace the nineteenth century's liberal ethics of "fair play" by the revolutionary ethics of the twentieth century. In that also we were right: a revolution conducted according to the rules of cricket is an absurdity. Politics can be relatively fair in the breathing spaces of history; at its critical turning points there is no other rule possible than the old one, that the end justifies the means. We introduced neo-Machiavellism into this country; the others, the counter-revolutionary dictatorships, have clumsily imitated it. We were neo-Machiavellians in the name of universal reason—that was our greatness; the others in the name of a national romanticism that is their anachronism. That is why we will *in the end* be absolved by history; but not they… [5]

Herein lies the birth of totalitarian politics.

The utopian, messianic vision of Marxism is materialized by the soteriological role played by the proletariat and turned itself as a universal class. The political dimension of Marx's social ontology is eminently *ideological*. For ideology is without fail a political program, although in his ideology-critique Marx regarded it as "false consciousness" because it expresses or mirrors the dominant class in a given society in history. According to Marx's famous or infamous eleventh thesis on Ludwig Feuerbach, "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in different ways; the point is to *change* it."[6] Regardless of varying commentaries on the thesis which ranges from being extremely laudatory to being most anti-philosophical, it fuels Marx's own vision of the future transformation as an eminently political program. *The Communist Manifesto* spells out the practical, ideological program

5) Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon*, trans. Daphne Hardy (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 97-98.
6) Karl Marx, *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), 69.

of Marx in ten principles:

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc., etc.[7)]

Third, bourgeois liberalism is for Marx inherently antisocial. Individualism is the antisocial principle of relationships between man and man which destroys the atmosphere of sociality as a harmonious nexus of relationships. In it individuals are out of tune with

7) Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 352.

one another. The ideology of liberalism highlights this antisocial principle of relationships between man and man which has its modern origin in Hobbes and Locke. In Lockeanism, however, there is a conscious integration of individualism and possessiveness (i.e., private property). Locke is the possessive individualist par excellence, for the concept of man as laborer is necessary for the acquisition of private property and wealth. The utilitarianism of labor and industry in exploiting and dominating nature or the land, which when uncultivated by human labor is called by Locke, "waste," builds the society of acquisitive individuals or "economic men." For Locke, things of nature are useless unless they acquire "values" on account of labor and industry. In the end Lockean "possessive individualism," as the late C. B. Macpherson called it, incorporates both antisocial principles of relationships between man and man on the one hand and between man and nature on the other. Herein lies the *ambivalence*, I think, of Marx's thought: while he renounces the "possessive individualism" of liberalism, he accepts its "labor theory of value."[8)]

Having said that Marx's social ontology has philosophical, political, and economic components, let us explore its basic principles in detail.

Marxism is primarily an ontology that questions and organizes human reality in such categories as praxis, labor, and sociality. Maurice Merleau-Ponty noted in 1947 that Marxism as a philosophy of man lay the basic conditions of humanism:

> The decline of proletarian humanism is not a crucial experience which invalidates the whole of Marxism. It is still valid as a critique of the present world and alternative humanisms. In this respect, at least, *it cannot be surpassed*. Even if it is incapable of shaping world history, it remains powerful enough to discredit other solutions. On close consideration, Marxism is not just any

8) For a critique of Marxism from the perspective of deep ecology in this regard, see Hwa Yol Jung, "Marxism and Deep Ecology in Postmodernity: From *Homo Oeconomicus* to *Homo Ecologicus*" prepared for delivery at the International Conference on "Marxism and the New Global Society," October 25-27, 1989, Seoul, Korea.

> hypothesis that might be replaced tomorrow by some other. It is the simple statement of those conditions without which there would be neither any humanism, in the sense of mutual relation between men, nor any rationality in history. In this sense Marxism is not a philosophy of history; it is *the* philosophy of history and to renounce it is to dig the grave of Reason in history. After that there can be no more dreams or adventures.[9]

In his famous "Letter on Humanism" in 1947, Martin Heidegger, whose questioning of Being is unsurpassed in the history of modern Western thought, refers to the idea of "homelessness" (*Heimatlosigkeit*) of the modern world whose destiny is tied to the historical character of Being. According to him, Marx's view of history is superior to other historical accounts because of its fundamental insight, inspired by Hegel, into alienation (*Entfremdung*) as having its roots in the homelessness of modern man.[10] Heidegger judged, albeit somewhat hastily, that because Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism fail to recognize the importance of the historical in Being, they are incapable of entering a productive dialogue with Marxism.

For Marx who follows the eighteenth-century Neapolitan Giambattista Vico, the historical is characteristic of *human specificity* or *eccentricity*, which is also an ontological precondition for epistemology. The Vichian principle says that how to know presupposes what there is to know, that is, the knowledge of human history depends on understanding that it is man-made. Only because human history is an order of *factum* it is *verum* for us. The order of *verum* follows the order of *factum*: but for the latter there would be no former. We have the certainty of historical knowledge because we make our own history, that is, history—both human and natural—is man-made. To be sure, there is also a history of nature, but it is only man who recognizes that he has a history or makes history. Marx seems

9) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror*, trans. John O'Neill (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 153.
10) Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 219-220.

to think that man makes not only his own history but external nature as well (i.e., nature mastered in and by technology is also man-made).

The world is for Marx a world because of praxis. In terms of praxis he defines human specificity as a whole. The essence of man as species-being (*Gattungswesen*) is realized in praxis which is social through and through. Praxis is one of the most important concepts in Marxian, "materialist" philosophy. As praxis is the genuinely human domain, Marx's "humanism" is a philosophy of praxis par excellence. Praxis is what defines man in his comprehensive totality. It is the "project" of man in making history and nature. First of all, praxis is not practical activity as opposed to thinking or knowing but is the determination of human specificity in its totality. Ontologically, praxis is not a correlate of cognition or an epistemological category, that is, the former is not a product of the latter. Rather, cognition is a form of praxis or theoretical praxis. Second, praxis is the activity which transforms man and society as well as nature. As man transforms nature by praxis, it becomes *techne* or the activity of "making." Third, praxis as social is a network of man's relationships with other men and women. The concept of sociality with its normative implications is that most distinguishing characteristic of Marxism as a philosophy of man.

Man as species-being is social through and through in producing, making, and doing. Marx's concern for alienation is focused on the social alienation of man from his fellow men and women, although he also spoke of alienation involving that of man from nature, from his activity, from his products and finally from himself. Thus the ultimate telos of praxis, which is the creation of Communism, is to produce a community of men and women but not a pile of goods and commodities. Human reality is an orchestration of social relationships. Sociality implies the simultaneous process of the internalization of the external and the externalization of the internal—the conception of sociality that is at once neither "individualistic" nor "sociologistic." Marx thus regards the structure of language as a *social* form of praxis. He wrote:

Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness, as it exists for other men, and for that reason is really beginning to exist for me personally as well; for

language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for men: the animal has no "relations" with anything, cannot have any. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all.[11]

What makes Marxism unique as a philosophy of praxis is its focus on labor as producing activity which is embodied in the activity of the proletariat. As a form of praxis, labor exhibits all the characteristics — the transformative and social attributes — of praxis itself. By his labor man transforms nature into use-objects and commodities which involves the *relations* as well as the *forces* of production. Labor is the appropriation of nature by man for man. Because of labor, according to Marx, nature itself appears to man to be *his* work and *his* reality. Broadly conceived, labor *is* characteristic of human specificity. We may conclude, therefore, that Marx "turned" to specific economic analysis in *Capital* without ever losing sight of the basic concern and issues raised in *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* which questions a philosophy of man. Marx's critique of capitalist political economy as dehumanizing is predicated on his definition of man's essence and his humanity. The phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty comes to the defense of Marx. He contends that it is wrong to say that in Marxism economics determines the totality of the social world as it is equally wrong to reduce Freudianism to human sexuality as a biological phenomenon. Instead, he suggests that the significance of the economic lies in that the problems of men are reflected in it, that is to say, there is a human significance in the economic. Merleau-Ponty declares:

> The real subject of history ⋯ is not only the economic subject, man as a factor in production, but in more general terms the living subject, man as creativity, as a person trying to endow his life with form, loving, hating, creating

11) Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, ed. R. Pascal (New York: International Publishers, 1947), 19.

> or not creating works of art, having or not having children. Historical materialism is not causality exclusive to economics. One is tempted to say that it does not base history and ways of thinking on production and ways of working, but more generally on ways of existing and co-existing, on human relationships. It does not bring the history of ideas down to economic history, but replaces these ideas in the one history which they both express, and which is that of social existence. Solipsism as a philosophical doctrine is not the result of a system of private property; nevertheless into economic institutions as into conceptions of the world is projected the same existential prejudice in favour of isolation and mistrust.[12)]

For Marxism as well as for Marx, labor is a corporeal movement which is "projective" or has a teleological positing. As such it represents the true humanity of man. Labor, in other words, is central to Marxian humanism. Marx's labor-intensive analysis of man as species-being has an important implication which has so often been forgotten and unnoticed, that it is conceived in Marx's revisionary way of defining man as opposed to the Hegelian or idealist view of man defined in terms of the abstract "rationality" of thought. For Marx, therefore, man defined *concretely* in terms of labor is an extension of his conception of man as "a natural, embodied, sentient, objective being." The aim of Marx's emphasis on man as a sensuous and embodied being is to offer a new view of man in opposition to the logocentric conception of man as "rational animal." In this sense it is correct to say that Marx's philosophy of man is *not* a philosophy of consciousness but a philosophy of incarnate man.

Marx distinguishes "humanity" from "animality" by way of labor. To quote every commentator's favorite passage in *Capital*:

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12) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 171, n. 1.

> We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will.[13]

Georg Lukács details not only Marx's "ontology of social being" but also labor itself as the *sine quo non* of social ontology. Marx's social ontology is a materialist ontology of nature to which the ontological primacy of the economic is most central. However, it is *not*, Lukács contends, one of "economism" which is a bourgeois conception. He explains:

> The economic works of the mature Marx are certainly consistently centered on the scientificity of economics, but they have nothing in common with the bourgeois conception of economics as simply one specific science: this conception isolates so-called phenomena of pure economics from the total inter-relations of social being as a whole, and analyses these in an artificial way that—in principle—allows the area thus elaborated to be put in an abstract connection with another that is just as artificially isolated (law, sociology, etc.), whereas Marx's economics always starts from the totality of social being and always flows back again into it.[14]

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13) Marx, *Capital*, Vol.1, 178.

14) Georg Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, Vol. 2: *Marx's Basic Ontological Principles*, trans. David Fernbach (London: Merlin Press, 1978), 12.

This is in brief what Lukács calls the ontological character of Marx's economics.

Ⅲ *Maoism as the Sinicization of Marxism*

In the millennia of Chinese history, there are two most *fundamental* transformations of Chinese culture which involve the cross-fertilization of two radically different *Weltanschauungen* in both their "deep" and "surface" structures: the transformation of Chinese culture by Indian Buddhism during the Sui and T'ang dynasties (581-907) and the transformation of Chinese culture by Occidental Marxism in the twentieth century. The former is complete inasmuch as it has permeated the historic-cultural topography of the Chinese people and their institutions and the latter is still at the stage of uncertainty and its future direction is far from being conclusive.

To trace the ancient root of Marxist or Mao's China in "Oriental Despotism" based on the "Asiatic mode of production" or hydraulic mechanisms, as Karl Wittfogel does, is to flirt with the intellectual mold of Hegel, Montesquieu, or even the Hegelian Marx called "Orientalism."[15] By ignoring the radical intent and result of Maoism in China, Wittfogel's thesis is tantamount to the claim that China's history — including that of Maoist China — is the static and seamless flow of the eternal yesterday. Orientalism is predicated upon the implicit or explicit assumption that Western civilization is morally and spiritually superior to Eastern culture which is being carried over by and evidenced in Western specialists and observers on modernization. In the familiar terminology of modernization, the scientific, technological, and industrial civilization of the West is superior to the non-scientific, non-technological, and non-industrial culture of the East.[16] In my view, however, the trans-

15) See Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

16) The British sociologist Zygmunt Bauman writes that "From at least the seventeenth century and well into the twentieth, the writing elite of Western Europe and its footholds on other continents considered its own way of life as a radical break in universal history. Virtually unchallenged faith in the superiority of its own mode over all alternative forms of life—contemporaneous or past—allowed it to take itself as the reference point for the interpretation of the *telos* of history. . . . Now, . . . Europe

formation of one culture by another is not "synthesis" in the sense of Hegel's teleology moving uni-directionally and progressively toward the "higher" or "better" stage of human consciousness and history. Rather, it is viewed as a "synergy" of two or more cultures.

Unfortunately, many of those who study the process of modernization and political development seem to scratch only the surface structures of society and culture under study at the expense of its deep structures. It is, I think, largely due to the scientific and quantitative prejudices of many American social scientists who are enamored by and obsessed with the idea of measuring and "empirically verifying" the scale and scope of transition or transformation from "tradition" to "modernity" only n terms of what is subject to quantification: urbanization, industrialization, mechanization, secularization, social mobility, role differentiation and proliferation, bureaucratization, mass communication media, commercialization, the growth of scientific and technological knowledge, etc. Their methodological slogan is that what is not measurable is not knowledge (i.e., quantitative reification). To be sure, quantitative methodology is not entirely wrong but is only one-sided. When quantification is identified with the whole truth, then it hides its own presuppositions. What is overlooked in quantification or the investigation of mere surface structures is the deep infrastructure which underlies all surface phenomena.

To get at the deep structures that underlie surface phenomena in culture, we must come to grips with the structure of commonly shared (i.e., intersubjective) meanings that are embodied in common practices and institutions. For culture is a calculus of intersubjective meanings. Unlike natural, phenomena, human events and things have meanings for men and women themselves who actually experience them. That is to say, unlike natural objects, human beings are *embodied subjects* for whom events and things have commonly or com-

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set the reference point of objective time in motion, attaching it firmly to its own thrust towards colonizing the future in the same way as it has colonized the surrounding space." *Legislators and Interpreters* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 110. For an extensive discussion on the subject, see the author's *The Question of Rationality and the Basic Grammar of Intercultural Texts* (Niigata: International University of Japan, 1989).

munally shared meanings. Intersubjective meanings in a culture are not simply "brute facts" which can fit into the conceptual grid of quantitative analysis. They are not merely subjective meanings alone which constitute the property of one or some individuals. They are not even the converging area of individual beliefs and values but are essentially modes of mutually shared social relationships. The nexus of intersubjective meanings is the way of experiencing thought and action (both individual and institutional) which is the very original stuff or practices and institutions in society in a given period of time. To put it differently, cultural "mentality" or "orientation" is *a system of intersubjective meanings* (and values) commonly shared by a group of people that has persisted throughout the ages within a given culture. It is the fleshfold of civility that combines the material and institutional externality of "civilization" and the spiritual internality of "culture." The fundamental transformation of culture is the occurrence of change in which the structure of intersubjective meanings penetrates into the layers of individual consciousness (and behavior) and institutions.

What must be recognized, which has often been ignored, is the fact that "modernization" by a Western ideology has been tempered by the indigenous conditions of China both traditional and contemporary. Mao's China — to borrow his own famous metaphor — "walks on two legs." The evidence of the Sinicization of Marxism in Mao is found in his anti-Soviet (or anti-Western) sentiments: the East wind must prevail over the West wind.

The basic grammar of Marxism is its "metaphoricality." The metaphor creates surplus meanings. Because of its metaphoricality or capacity to produce surplus meanings, the Sinicization of Marxism is possible. Marxism is a philosophy of man based on the primacy of praxis over theoria. When humanism and the primacy of praxis become integrated, Marxism — as Marx himself emphasized — is a practical humanism which is also Confucian. For Marx, to be radical means to get at the root and the root of man is man himself. Confucianism is also a practical humanism. By means of metaphoricality, therefore, the "civil religion" of Confucianism is interchangeable with that of Marxism. Both Confucianism and Marxism are equally a practical humanism and eminently a *social* ontology. Thus the

"official ideology" of Confucianism is replaced by Mao with that of Marxism without changing the "weight" of the linguistic context of Mao's China.

The Chinese socio - cultural life - world is this worldly, practical, concrete, and particular rather than other-worldly, speculative, abstract, and general. It is definitely an orientation of and an emphasis on the *vita active* rather than the *vita contemplativa*. The praxis of man is identifiable with a nexus of social relationships in the harmonious form of graded hierarchy: the rules of reciprocity and the rituals of propriety. As a practical humanism, Chinese thought emphasizes not so much what man is as how he acts and ought to act. As it focuses on the nexus of social relationships, it puts a premium on social morality in the everyday life-world as the way of Chinese thought culminating in the idea of being genuinely human, being benevolent. In short, Chinese thought seeks the unity of thought and action in terms of the primacy of the latter over the former. The unity of knowledge and action is one of the most persistent themes in Chinese philosophy from Confucius and Mencius to Wang Yang-ming and Mao Zedong.

Marxism is both a revolutionary philosophy and a philosophy of revolution. First, it is revolutionary in that "traditional" philosophy based on the primacy of theoria is replaced with a "new" philosophy of revolution in that political revolution is the backbone of the transformation of bourgeois culture (i.e., the primacy of politics in Marxism). The basic grammar of Marxism is, in other words, politics. In Mao's China, the "political ideology" of Confucianism has now been substituted *only in form* but not in substance with that of Marxism. Whatever anti-Confucian "rhetoric" we find in Chinese Marxism, the Sinicization of Marxism has been facilitated by its structural similarities with Confucianism. It should be noted that in Confucian philosophy the importance of politics in everyday Chinese life is expressed in the concept of (political) loyalty. The supreme importance of political practices is suggested in the Chinese character *wang* ("ruler," "prince," or "sovereign") that symbolizes the sovereign authority of a ruler. The ideogram of *wang* is composed of three parallel horizontal strokes joined together by one vertical stroke. These three horizontal strokes present from top to bottom each of the three spheres of heaven,

man, and earth and the vertical stroke connects or unifies them. *Wang* is a cosmic general will. As such the political sovereign is the unifier of the most important elements of Chinese cosmology—heaven, man, and earth.

The originality of Maoism and the Sinicization of Marxism were made possible because the "context-freeing" metaphor of the "oppressed" is substituted with the "peasantry." The Sinicization of Marxism (in Maoism) is equivalent to the interpretation of Marxism in terms of the indigenous (i.e., Chinese) context of political, economic, social, and cultural structures. Furthermore, when Chinese mentality is characterized by its emphasis on practicality and concreteness, the iconic and functional rather than the conceptual components of metaphoricality appear to be extremely relevant to our analysis of the Sinicization of Marxism. For example, the iconic emphasis of Chinese mentality is the belief that one picture is better than a thousand words (i.e., anti-verbalism and anti-scholasticism). Mao's "scatological lyricism" may be viewed as an expression of the iconic mentality of the Chinese people. In the important philosophical essay "On Practice" which, along with "On Contradiction," was written in the summer of 1937 at the insistence of the Party to sum up the experience of the Chinese revolution that combined "the essentials of Marxism with concrete and everyday Chinese examples,"[17] Mao emphasized the interrelatedness of everyday perception and cognition. For perception is the first step in cognition that comes in contact with the objects of the external world. Then, cognition is the process of synthesizing the data of perception by judgment and inference. Therefore, cognition depends on perception in knowing the world. However, perceptual knowledge must be deepened, that is, elevated to the level of "rational knowledge." One who denies the dependence of cognition on perception is called "idealist," whereas one who denies the existence of "rational knowledge" is called "empiricist." The dialectics of the theory of knowledge, according to Mao, refute both idealism and empiricism. "Rational knowledge," he writes, "depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge — this is the

17) Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1972), 17.

dialectical - materialist theory of knowledge. In philosophy, neither 'rationalism' nor 'empiricism' understands the historical or the dialectical nature of knowledge, and although each of these schools contains one aspect of the truth (here I am referring to materialist, not to idealist, rationalism and empiricism), both are wrong on the theory of knowledge as a whole."[18]

As early as 1938 Mao Zedong spoke of the Sinicization of Marxism and "concrete Marxism" as opposed to "abstract Marxism." He often criticized "complete Westernization" as untenable to the people of China. In relation to the adaptation of Marxism to Chinese conditions, Mao said in 1938:

> The history of our great people over several millennia exhibits national peculiarities and many precious qualities. As regards all this, we are merely elementary-school students. Today's China is an outgrowth of historic China. We are Marxist historicists; we must not mutilate history. From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen we must sum it up critically, and *we must constitute ourselves the heirs of all that is precious in this past* (my emphasis). Conversely, the assimilation of this heritage itself turns out to be a kind of methodology that is of great help in the guidance of the revolutionary movement. A Communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be applied. *There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used.* If a Chinese Communist, who is a part of the great Chinese people, bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism apart from Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an empty abstraction. Consequently, *the Sinification of Marxism—that*

18) Mao Tse-tung, *Four Essays on Philosophy* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1968), 13.

> *is to say*, making certain that in all of its manifestations it is imbued with Chinese peculiarities, using it according to these peculiarities—becomes a problem that must be understood and solved by the whole Party without delay… We must put an end to writing eight-legged essays on foreign models; there must be less repeating of empty and abstract refrains; we must discard our dogmatism and replace it by a new and vital Chinese style and manner, pleasing to the eye and to the ear of the Chinese common people.[19]

This passage of Mao is important not only because it refers to "concrete Marxism" as applied to the Chinese tradition and peculiarities but also because it embodies a characteristic unique to Chinese mentality, that is, anti-scholastic and perceptual concreteness of which his "scatological lyricism" is only a part.

In addition to the metaphoricality of the peasantry (and the countryside), further evidence of the Sinicization of Marxism in the thought of Mao is found in his idea of the dialectic. For Marx as for Hegel, the dialectic is the logic of a linear progression in history as well as in human thought—the endless progression of affirmation, negation, and the negation of the negation. This progression contains the idea of progress in which one stage of historical movement which is also reflected in the patterns of human thought is the result of a synthesis of what has preceded. So the synthesis or the negation of the negation is a resolution or the removal of the conflict between two opposites onto a "higher" level (a "new positivity"). For Hegel and Marx, the contradiction of two opposites is ultimately *resolved* in the idea of the State (the Prussian model) and in the highest state of Communism, respectively. In contrast, however, Mao in his essay "On Contradiction" speaks of contradiction without a final resolution which is unlike Hegel and Marx. Although to be sure Mao uses the language of Marxism in discussing the notin of contradiction, it is interesting to note that for Mao China too has the tradition of the dialectic or

19) Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, rev. and enl. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 113-114.

contradiction. "We Chinese often say," he writes, "'things that oppose each other also complement each other.'"[20] Speaking of the complementarity (into the resolution) of opposites as "identity," Mao writes:

> Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without "above," there would be no "below"; without "below," there would be no "above." Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; without difficulty, there would be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semi-colonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity.[21]

Mao declared that all relationships are contradictions. Without contradictions there would be no world. Thus contradiction *is* the stuff of life and the world, as life and the world are characterized by a nexus of relationships. Like the natural rhythm of the seasons, it is the rhythm of life, reality, and truth. Without it there would be no life, no reality, and no truth. In sum, therefore, Mao's view of man and the universe is akin to the cosmological principle of *yin* and *yang*—the unresolved struggle, coexistence, and unity of two opposites.

To sum up: the unique and original contribution of Maoism to the general development

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20) *Four Essays on Philosophy*, 68.
21) *Ibid*., 61.

of Marxism itself, I should insist, is anchored in and derived from its historical continuity with the Chinese past. The question of historical continuity is elusive and overlooked because it is often, if not always, something assumed, given or taken for granted, that is, often unconscious and implicit rather than conscious and explicit in the mind of interpreters and translators of cultures both their own and foreign. Mao's own ambivalent attitude toward the issue of historical continuity — both his refusal and recognition or acceptance of it on different occasions — is an indication less of political convenience or double talk than of the very nature of the dialectical interplay between what is old and indigenous and what is new and foreign.

Ⅳ. Maoism and Psychohistory

Psychohistory, which is an interface between psychology and history with a psychoanalytical bent, gives us an unusual glimpse into the motivational makeup of Mao as a revolutionary mind.[22] It is a new paradigm of filling the vacuum created by the inadequacy of the existing methods and approaches in the human sciences. The formulation of psychohistory is most fundamentally influenced by Freud and Erik Erikson. Among psychoanalytical models which are in vogue in the analysis of the "personality politics" of Mao Zedong in a flurry of writings by Lucian Pye, Richard Solomon, Bruce Mazlish and others, Robert Jay Lifton's psychohistory is — besides being far more discerning than they — most relevant to our inquiry for two reasons: its emphasis is on the symbolic form and it attempts to put history back into psychoanalytical thought.

Although the idea of psychohistory is implicit in some works sof Freud — as Erikson himself was a student of Freud — Lifton claims that psychohistory is essentially "*pre*historical" rather than "historical." Psychohistory as a post-Freudian movement, accord-

22) For Robert J. Lifton's summary views on the goal and method of psychohistory, see particularly "On Psychohistory" in *Explorations in Psychohistory*, ed. R. J. Lifton with E. Olson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 21-41 and *The Life of the Self* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976).

ing to Lifton, resists the temptation of "ego-psychology" in interweaving the psychological (the individual) with the historical (society). Unlike the tendencies of Freudian ego - psychology, psychohistory affirms the "historical" order of man — historical or developmental in both an ontogenetic and phylogenetic sense. Although he would be the last man to deny an "intrapsychic breakthrough" in Erikson's pioneering studies of "great men in history" (Luther and Gandhi), Lifton has a more strong and integral sense of the historical than his mentor. For Lifton psychohistory poses questions about the events of a great man (for example, Mao) as a historical phenomenon *sui generis* rather than just about how the objective structures of history influence a great man. A great hero is a microscopic sample of historical order itself. Although Lifton does not admit it explicitly, his psychohistory is not incompatible with Marxism as a historical or social critique. Thus it should be noted here that the basic insight of Herbert Marcuse lies in integrating the psychological and the sociological, that is, in his attempt to reconcile the thought of Freud with that of Marx.[23] In this regard, Marcuse too asserts that the traditional separation of the psychological from the sociological and political has become obsolete and meaningless by virtue of the human condition prevailing in the present era because the formerly autonomous psychic processes are now being filtered through and absorbed by the function of the individual in society and politics. That is to say, the private functions of the individual are no longer separable from his public existence whereupon the private disorder reflects the disorder of the whole society and thus the cure of the former depends on that of the latter. So Marcuse insists that the fight for Eros, that is, the fight for liberation in eradicating "repression" and "alienation," is a function of revolutionary political praxis.

For the purpose of our present inquiry, Lifton's psychohistory is a nursery of significant insights into the agonizing issues of "survival," "holocaust" and "transformation" as the primary existential indices of twentieth-century man. First of all, he makes a symbolic turn from the instinctual idiom of orthodox Freudianism. Lifton considers man as "a sym-

23) See *Eros and Civilization* (Boston: Beacon press, 1966).

bol-forming organism" (*homo symbolicus*) the recognition of which is a new key in social theorizing. The Freudian theme of the giant struggle between Eros and Thanatos for Lifton turns into a battle of symbolic forms. For Lifton, therefore, the symbolic form would be the origin rather than the result of social life.

Second, an interesting point in Lifton's psychohistory is its "phenomenological" component which is combined with its "empirical" and "speculative" ones. He prefers to call the "phenomenological" "formative" presumably because, correlative to his symbolic turn, his emphasis is on "forms" which are simultaneously individual and collective. Interrelated to the empirical, the formative and speculative components of Lifton's psychohistorical method also purport to be a "trinity" of (1) universality, (2) specific cultural emphasis and style, and (3) contemporary historical influences in the context of his cross-cultural research (for example, Mao's revolutionary politics). For Lifton, every shared event (social event) is neither purely universal, nor cultural-historical, nor contemporary-historical, but it is all three at once.

Third and last, Lifton speaks of "advocacy research" and participant observation. Strictly speaking, psychoanalysis — like phenomenology — is concerned with understanding or interpretation rather than evaluation (advocacy). Advocacy research, however, is an extra dimension to Lifton's psychohistory along with the works of Kenneth Keniston and Robert Coles. It works like a therapy, as it were, in social theorizing. As such it is in essence a counter-proposal to the notion of ethical neutrality which presents the dominant view of social-scientific research in the behavioral sciences today. Moreover, unlike the psychoanalytical technique which poses a therapeutic distance between the doctor and the patient wherein the former is proffered a privileged position over the latter, participant observation aims at a mutually shared exploration of the investigator and the investigated in social research. Here social research is seen as a result of the shared project performed by both the observer and the observed.

Armed with these methodological underpinnings of his psychohistory, Lifton shows a flair for extraordinary events. As is the advent of psychoanalysis in the human sciences

since Freud, Lifton's psychohistory is extraordinary whose central theme is *death* or *survival* in relation to the issues of "holocaust" and "transformation." The problem of death is as old as life or humanity itself. As an existential absolute, death is the center of the existentialist concern in such thinkers as Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger. For Kierkegaard, it is the source of "fear and trembling"; Heidegger defines man's finitude as a "being-toward-death." Death or the denial of death is the most universal, ultimate and utmost issue to which everything else is subordinate; in it man's existential dilemma (di-lemma, that is, the two lemmas of life and death) is absolved. It is the ultimate key that unlocks the mystery of human life and culture. The denial of death explains the good and evil, narcissism, repression, the meaning of anality, the heroic, the Oedipal complex, the sacred or religious, and others—all in one. There is an abundance of evil as a result of man's futile effort to deny what is ultimately undeniable — the biggest of all deceptions — as man's *desire for immortality* ranges from heroism to the fetishism of money and technology. Yet worse, for Ernest Becker the denial of death is as paradoxical as the evil that emanates from man's desire for immortality: man is willing to die in order not to die and evil also results from man's very urge to overcome it.[24] For Becker, this paradox of evil *is* the very morbidity of human sociability and there is no way out. Hobbes too depicted man's aggressive act of fear against every other man in the nightmarish "state of nature" resulting from an extroversion of the death instinct (*bellum omnium contra omnes*). However, Hobbes' monstrous Leviathan is no match for Becker's paradox of evil because the remedy is always as bad as the initial evil itself. In Becker, therefore, we should particularly take notice of the fact that *man's search for the heroic is nothing but an extension of the fear and denial of death*—the heroics of Mao Zedong notwithstanding. The search for "cosmic significance" — as Becker calls it — is an expression of man's desire to exist or to stand out, to be *the one* in creation which begins with the very early stages of our life. In the heroics, the biological necessity of man's death is overcome by the seman-

24) Ernest Becker, *The Denial of Death* (New York: Free Press, 1973), 11.

tic or symbolic form of desire to exist or to be. Hegel, too, observed that "recognition" is an issue of life-and-death and as an essential aspect of the development of self-consciousness. Man's search for "cosmic significance" is the ultimate meaning of man as *homo symbolicus*. This fact alone makes man stand out from nature or the rest of creation. For, according to Becker, man is not just "a blind glob of idling protoplasm" but is a creature with a name — or, better, a proper name inscribed in capital letters demanding the recognition of one's uniqueness — who lives in a world of symbols. If we endow any organism with self-consciousness and a name, Becker thus insists, we will be able to make it stand out from the rest of nature.

On the other hand, Lifton's argument is not "morbid-minded" as Becker's eternal damnation of man emanating from the denial of death or immortality. As Lifton advances his own argument without any specific reference to Becker—though they admire each other's intellectual acumen, the sense of immortality for Lifton is much more than the mere denial of death; it is "life-enforcing." Lifton experiments on psychohistory with the theme of "revolutionary immortality" in his study of the psychology of Mao and the history of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s whose insights, I might add, may very well enlighten today's China of Deng Xiaoping in his ailing old age. For Lifton, *revolutionary immortality is an aspect of symbolic immortality*. By symbolic immortality, he means man's need to create an inner sense of continuity in his involvement with his cultural and historical process which may be expressed in five major different forms ("ideal types" in the Weberian sense): biological, theological, social, naturalistic, and "oceanic." By revolutionary immortality, Lifton means a shared sense of participating in revolutionary fermentation whereby individual death is transcended by "living on" indefinitely with the ongoing movement of revolution. Although there is a difference between Mao and Trotsky, the former's revolutionary immortality is clearly and directly expressed in the latter's ideological principle of "permanent revolution." According to Lifton, this revolutionary immortality in the transformation of Mao's China in the twentieth century is a radical alteration or shift from "biological immortality" in traditional China, particularly in the tradition of Confucian eth-

ics, where the importance of an individual family and ancestors is emphasized, to the view of the Chinese people as a revolutionary community who together contribute to the cause of the revolution as a whole rather than of individual recognition or accomplishment.

By emphasizing revolutionary immortality as a form of symbolic immortality, Lifton's psychohistory makes a shift from the instinctual to the symbolic idiom as culture itself is a constellation and accumulation of significant symbols. The symbol is a mental construct upon events necessary for men to orient themselves toward the ongoing flow of their experiences. Consistent with the Chinese tradition of the "rectification of names," therefore, revolutionary immortality for Lifton is first and foremost the immortalization of words. As the symbol is a psychohistorical interplay, that is, the interplay between the individual (Mao) and the historical (the Cultural Revolution), the symbolic form of Mao's death indicated in the numerous events of his life is projected onto the perpetuation of the Chinese Revolution as a historical event. The desire to perpetuate the Revolution corresponds to Mao's desire for "cosmic significance." It is no accident then that the banner of "The East is Red" was being carried on by the young "self-negating" Red Guard—the symbol of the youth who, unlike Mao in his waning years, is relatively distant from imminent death. Lifton emphasizes that "*Rather than speak of Mao as a 'father-figure' or 'mother-figure' for his countrymen (no doubt he has been both), we do better to see him as a death-conquering hero who became the embodiment of Chinese immortality*."[25] He speaks of Mao as "eternal survivor" and Mao's obsession with the "immortality of the flesh" and a "permanent revolution" as "survival paranoia" which is not meant to be pathological or clinical. What is so unique about Mao and the psychic contours of the Cultural Revolution, according to Lifton, is that they are "a kind of *existential absolute, an insistence upn all-or-none confrontation with death*."[26] He explains many ideological slogans in terms of the symbolic form of death, survival and immortality: "The East is Red," "serve the

25) *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Cultural Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1968), 85.
26) *Ibid*., 66.

people," "our God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people," "the East wind prevails over the West wind," and so on. In Lifton's explanation, the Marxian *ideology* of permanent revolution as a cluster of significant ideas that prescribe the transformation of the existing social order is reduced simply and ultimately to the symbolic form of survival or immortality as revolutionary immortality is a form of symbolic immortality.

V. The Personalized Ideology of Kim Il Sung and the Question of Unification

The importance of our preceding discussion concerning Maoism is essentially twofold. In the first place, Maoism is the Sinicized or indigenized form of Marxism. In the second place, the Cultural Revolution in the 60s, in the waning years of Mao, is symbolized by his quest for immortality. There is, however, a significant difference between Maoism and Kim's ideology: in Mao symbolic immortality is subordinated to the calculated accomplishment of the Marxian goals (e.g., permanent revolution), whereas in Kim the Marxian goals, if any, are subordinated to his symbolic immortality. Kim's ideology is neither (Marx's) dictatorship of the proletariat (peasantry) nor (Lenin's) democratic centralism but the highly personalized and idiosyncratic ideology of *chuch'e* (*juche*) whose most outstanding part is none other than the *Führerprinzip*.

Dae-sook Suh, who is the most astute observer of Kim, concludes his most recent *Kim Il Sung* and the ideology of *chuch'e* with the paragraph which is quoted here without any further elaboration or commentary:

> In the darkest of his guerrilla fighting days, Kim was never afraid of the Japanese expeditionary force. What he feared more was the hunger, the cold, the snow, and the defection of his men. Today, in the last years of his life, Kim is not afraid of his political enemies at home or abroad. What he fears more than his enemies are old age, declining health, the growing though benign

tumor in his neck, and loneliness as his aging comrades die.[27]

The death-defying heroics of Kim's youthful days have finally succumbed to his old age. It is contended that his ideology of *chuch'e* — which is of very recent origin — and his politics instrumentalize an allegedly Marxist ideology of his inevitable death—in other words, from symbolically immortalizing his life. Every significant event in North Korea points to the personification of Kim Il Sung himself. Only in this context do I agree with Suh's comment that Kim's *chuch'e* ideology is not the indigenization or "domestication" of Communism in the North but it is really "irrelevant to the tenets of communism or the intellectual profundities of Marxism and Leninism."[28] Unlike Maoism or the ideology of Mao which is Sinicized Marxism, Kim's ideology of totalism is highly a personalized one or the cultivation of the cult of personality which resembles the era of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Kim's *chuch'e* ideology abroad, to the Third World, can be seen as aiming for domestic political consumption, that is, a means of deifying his status as the "Great Father." Mao's indigenization or, as he himself called it, "nationalization" and "historicization" of Marxism is manifested in the substitution of the proletariat for the peasantry and in the interpretation of the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic in terms of the long-established tradition of the Chinese *yin-yang* logic which is highly original. There is, however, no visible indigenization of Marxism in "Kimilsungism."

The ideology of symbolic immortality, as it has already been intimated, may be manifested in several different forms. In the Confucian tradition—in Korea both South and North and Japan as well as China—symbolic immortality is embodied in ancestor worship, the perpetuation of the family, and filial piety. While in the writings of Confucius there is the differentiated gradation between the political and the filial, in Kim's personalized politics one is subsumed in the other: there is, in other words, the *politicization of filial piety*. As we observed after the death of Lenin, Stalin, or Mao, there was a succession crisis within

27) *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 324.
28) *Ibid.*, 301.

a totalitarian political system which ensures a bitter power struggle and creates inevitably an ideological sectarianism within the movement. In North Korea, the succession of Kim Il Sung by Kim Jong Il represents not only the highly personalized style of totalitarian politics but also symbolic immortality by politicizing filial piety.[29]

The question of unification is a volatile issue in the context of Kim's ideology of symbolic immortality which may be translated into practical politics in which the means is dictated totally by the end to be achieved.[30] It cannot be solved or resolved in terms of the personalized politics of Kim Il Sung who is nearing his death. But it must wait out Kim's death and the resolution of his succession and the ensuing stability of North Korean politics. There is also the danger of injecting into it terroristic violence or even

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29) According to Carl J. Friedrich, all totalitarian societies of our time possess the following characteristics:
1. An official ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence, to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere at leat passively; this ideology is characteristically focused in terms of chiliastic claims as to the "perfect" final society of mankind.
2. A single mass party consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total population (up to 10 percent) of men and women passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to the ideology and prepared to assist in every way in promoting its general acceptance, such party being organized in strictly hierarchical, oligarchical manner, usually under a single leader and typically either superior to or completely commingled with the bureaucratic governmental organization.
3. A technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control (in the hands of the party and its subservient cadres, such as the bureaucracy and the armed forces) of all means of effective armed combat.
4. A similarly technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of control (in the same hands) of all means of effective mass communication, such as the press, radio, motion pictures, and so on.
5. A system of terroristic police control, depending for its effectiveness upon points 3 and 4 and characteristically directed not only against demonstrable "enemies" of the regime, but against arbitrarily selected classes of the population; such arbitrary selection turning upon exigencies of the regime's survival, as well as ideological "implications," and systematically exploiting scientific psychology. "The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society," in *Totalitarianism*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 52-53.

30) The progress of the North-South Korean dialogue on unification is well documented in National Unification Board, Republic of Korea, *A White Paper on South-North Dialogue* (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1988).

aggression which under the political circumstances of South and North Korea may be justified by the North as a "revolutionary" act rather than a last-ditch act of defying death. What is wrong with violence, any violence, is that it rejects the *epistemological* principle of fallibility and the *ethical* principle of culpability. The belief of one who resorts to violence is predicated upon the absolute dogma that *he* cannot possibly be mistaken. In other words, it refutes the possibility of any dialogue—including the "dialogue" between South and North Korea on the question of unification.

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Abstract

Marxism and the Question of Korean Unification

Jung, Hwa Yol

This essay tackles the thorny and futile question of Korean unification. In order to understand the nature of the allegedly Marxist/Communist North Korean political regime under the highly personalized politics of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the author traces the history of Marxism as humanistic social ontology and then Maoism as the Sinicized form of Western Marxism whose metaphoricality allows its revolutionary forces from the proletariat to the peasantry. Kim Il Sung's ideology, however, can simply be reduced to nothing but the highly cultish politics of "self-sufficiency" (*chuch'e*) which is the outmoded manifestation of Korea as a "hermit kingdom." Furthermore, I question the enigmatic motives of the South Korean government in continuing the procrastinating process of unification.

❑ Key words : Marx's social ontology, Maoism, Kimilsungism, psychohistory, unification

초록

마르크스주의와 한국의 통일문제

정화열

이 논문은 한국의 통일에 대한 곤란하고 부질없는 질문을 터놓고 이야기한다. 안으로는 김일성과 김정일에 의한 대단히 개인화된 정치이면서도 겉으로는 마르크스주의와 공산주의를 내세우는 정치체제 성격을 이해하기 위해서, 저자는 인본주의적인 사회존재론으로서의 마르크스주의 역사를 추적한다. 그런 후 서양의 마르크시즘을 중국화하여 프롤레타리아로부터 소작농으로 혁명적 힘을 허용하는 메타포를 가능하게 한 마오이즘을 살펴볼 것이다. 그러나 김일성의 이데올로기는 기껏해야 주체라는 숭배적인 정치로 귀착될 뿐이다. 주체 이데올로기는 "은둔자 왕국"이라는 시대에 뒤쳐진 한국의 다른 표현일 뿐이다. 또한 나는 통일의 과정을 계속해서 질질 끄는 남한 정부의 불가사의한 동기들에 대해서도 질문할 것이다.

❑ 주제어 : 마르크스의 사회적 존재론, 모택동주의, 김일성주의, 심리역사학, 한반도통일

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